



ISRAELI TERROR Essential To Imperialist Plan

As we write this commentary, Israeli naval and air power continue to bomb and shell Palestinian camps in all parts of Lebanon. This military escalation of Israeli aggression takes place as Kissinger is reported to have almost reached an agreement of disengagement between Syria and Israel. Part of Israel's assigned role in the proposed «peaceful settlement» is the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Faced with a continuous escalation (especially since Kiryat Shamouna) of military operations in Palestine, the Zionist leadership of Israel decided to transcend Kissinger's timetable by attacking the Palestinian people in the camps, hence leaping over various phases of the aforementioned plan. This attack elucidates that for the imperialist plan to succeed, the military and physical liquidation and elimination of the Palestinian resistance movement is both a pre-condition and a must. For the resolution of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict, Kissinger's schema followed the process of isolating various fronts from one another, in order to reach full disengagement on the various fronts hence establishing a new status quo which would impose the imperialist plan on the Palestinians i.e. the proposed Palestinian puppet state.

Having recognized that capitulation is an inherent and essential component of the Kissinger manoeuvres, we, the PFLP, along with various other organizations voiced our categorical rejection of the above mentioned plan and called for the need of escalating our struggle on all levels and in particular the armed struggle in the occupied territories. To abort the imperialist plan we postulated that armed struggle is the only way through which we could safeguard the revolutionary content of the Palestinian resistance. Subsequently we must free ourselves from all illusions that any part of Palestine can be liberated and a national authority can be established on it through the proposed settlement.

As such the latest wave of military operations have posited the proper guidelines that the Palestine National Council must adopt. This Council (the 12th) which has been postponed on various occasions must more than ever convene in order to lay the proper bases of unity based on the confrontation of the imperialist plan, by categorically refusing to be



a party to the proposed settlement i.e. Geneva Conference and the proposed state.

We are confronted with a simple question, why has the Twelfth Palestine National Council been postponed several times? It is our opinion that the postponement of the Palestine National Council is primarily due to the ongoing disengagement talks on the Syrian front. It is argued that if an agreement were to be reached on the Syrian front, then it would simplify the task of adopting a position by the P.L.O. The advocates of such a line are falling prey to the ongoing politicking between Kissinger and the Arab leaders. It is our opinion that the Palestinian position and the national rights of the Palestinian people are matters that must not wait for the termination of the ongoing disengagement talks. For though we can influence the Arab opinion and progressive opinion in general our primary responsibility is the adoption of a clear program that will safeguard

our masses' revolution. In addition if the P.L.O. were to take a unified political stand as of now, this would be added pressure and a reminder to all Arab leaders, that the pursuit of the road to capitulation will be met by the wrath of the people.

Basically, the task that awaits the Twelfth Palestine National Council is the reaffirmation and adoption of the basic principles of the Eleventh Council held in Cairo in January 1973. Included in that program was an opposition to the mentality that yields to compromise and advocates the formation of artificial entities, especially the proposed Palestinian state on part of the Palestinian land. In addition it calls for the struggle against such mentalities and the military and political confrontations of their programs. To confront our enemy effectively, we must be armed with a clear and concise political programs that reflects the aspirations of our masses for total liberation.

It is long overdue for the P.L.O. to adopt a firm and frank position

as regard our struggle in light of the proposed and partially applied political compromises since the October war. If our position is to solidify our ranks by adopting a unified program, then it is imperative that the P.L.O. adopt a clear position lest it become a full participant in the compromises and liquidation at hand.

Perhaps the major lesson that pessimists ought to have learned from the post October war period is that only through the continuation armed struggle could our goal of liberating Palestine be achieved. Both in and out of the occupied territories, our masses confidence in their ability to escalate the struggle is crystalizing. This newly rejuvenated confidence on their part has played a major role in the deepening of the internal conflicts of the state of Israel. The Arab leaders, Sadat and co., instead of recognizing the revolutionary potential of the masses (one of the positive factors uncovered by the October war), are only too willing to engage in negotiation that can only lead to fundamental compromises on the account of the national rights of the Palestinian people. It should be clear by now that any disengagement between Arab and Israeli forces is not a military step but the precondition for the striking of the Palestinian resistance movement. It is no wonder that as the present Israeli attempt to liquidate the resistance proceeds, Sadat and co., stand by as silent observers.

This new wave of Israeli terror, instead of discouraging our masses, has in fact solidified our masses' will and has deepened the unity of the Lebanese and Palestinian masses who have been the human targets of the indiscriminate Israeli bombing and shelling.

If the Zionist leaders of Israel believe that through such terror they can silence our struggle, they like their American counter-parts in Vietnam, will come to the realization that once the people's will is put in motion, then no power on earth can deter them from achieving final victory, in our case the total liberation of Palestine. If the Zionists have any doubt, they need only look at the history of their terror to recognize that instead of silencing the Palestinian people, they have shown them clearly that the only way to resolve the contradictions in the area, is through the negation of Zionism and its lifeline imperialism.

MEMORIAL SERVICE

For Munir Mughrabi, Ahmed el Sheikh Mahmud and Yassin Mozani. Killed in Kiryat Shemona. 11 April 1974.

It seems simple to go,
to accept
a simple decision,
and to die among the walls
of occupied rooms.

Only a short awaking spring
you have spend with us,
without hesitating making you
ready to sacrifice

for the holy act of revolution.
Perhaps that was enough.
Maybe it is more valuable
to know that it was your wish,
but still it is hard
to break the blossomtwigs.

We have might it again,
the heroism of youth,
and we know it will never die.
It is your hands who keep the
torch,
a burning flame in the wind.

By Ila Ramdane.

ISRAELI TERROR



May 15, 1974 to most people was an ordinary day, but to our Palestinian masses this date ever since 1948 has been a painful reminder of the colonization of our land by the Zionists. As the enemy was celebrating the 26th anniversary of the declaration of its state, Palestinian revolutionaries carried out three military operations in Haifa, Jérusalem and Maalot .

The latter operation was carried out by three revolutionaries of the Democratic Front. We have already heard accusations against what the bourgeois press calls «terror», the question however remains: whose terror?

Ziad Abed-Al-Raheem, Ali Ahmed and Ahmad Saleh, the three revolutionaries, upon successfully occupying a school building in Tarshiha — an Arab town that has been turned into one of the Zionists' settlements — Maalot, immediately assured the hostages that nothing would happen to them if the Israeli authorities would earnestly cooperate. The following demands were put forth:

1. Release 26 political prisoners (their names were specified);
2. Demand that the International Red Cross oversee the release;
3. Request the French and Rumanian ambassadors to mediate between the commandos and the Zionist leadership;
4. Inform the families that the hostages are safe and if anything happens to them, the Israeli authorities bear full responsibility;
5. Request the Maalot municipal government to demand full cooperation from the Israeli authorities as regard meeting the demands in exchange for the

hostages;

6. Distribution of a political communique in Hebrew, Arabic and English.

Initially the Israeli authorities indicated that they would cooperate, but apparently behind the declaring of this false intention the Israeli cabinet was stalling so as to plan a military attack. The attack ensued and about 28 of the hostages were killed by Israeli gunfire and our three revolutionaries died a noble death and joined the ranks of the martyrs.

Israel's disrespect for human life once again caused the death of many. Through this operation, the Israeli authorities proved that they neither respect their own civilians nor the lives of the rightful inhabitants of Palestine.

Not satisfied with the killings they caused, Israel went on a barbaric spree of bombings and shelling of Lebanon. They claimed to strike only «terrorist» bases, but then the results indicate otherwise. They bombed and shelled Palestinian camps at Ein El Helwa and Nabatiya. In addition they struck Rashidya camp through naval power. They dropped gaseous bombs, Napalm (2500 pound bombs) and timed explosive devices (see picture). The alleged «terrorists» included hospitals, medical clinics, civilian dwellings and buildings. More importantly over 60 women and children have already been killed and 150-200 injured. Nabatiya camp has been leveled.

Has Israel's propoganda fooled you again? No they did not bomb military targets, they indiscriminately bombed civilian targets and have proved to be quite consistent in their disrespect for human life.

KIRYAT SHAMOUNA

If the October war was instrumental in destroying the myth of Israel's invincibility, then the Kiryat Shamouna operation, which was carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command) has crystallized that insecurity is an inherent and essential component of the Zionist settler state.

It was April 10, 1974 when the three Arab heroes occupied two buildings and took several hostages with them as they presented demands to Israel :

1. Release 100 Fedayes from Israeli prisons, among them to include :
 - a) The Japanese Fedayee Kozo Okamoto;
 - b) The Palestinian women and in particular Aida Issa from Gaza,
 - c) The injured and sick.
2. Send the released prisoners to the nearest Arab country.
3. All this should take place within six hours, or the PFLP (General Command) will not be responsible for what happens.

Of course, the Israeli authorities did not yield to these demands. Instead they opened fire on the building in which the three Fedayees along with their hostages were situated. In addition to the death of the three heroic martyrs, several of the hostages were killed and injured due to the Israeli attack.

Under colonial conditions, and in particular in a settlement such as Kiryat Shamouna which is nothing

but a base for the expansion and forging of the colonial policies, it is the colonizer that must bear the burden and responsibility for the death and injury of «innocent» civilians.

Let us draw a parallel to the film *Battle of Algiers*. When the placed bombs exploded in the cafes of the European sector of Algiers, we all were forced to think soberly about the death of civilians. We concluded that these civilians though perhaps not carrying arms that killed our revolutionaries, were part of the colonial policy and program of imposing subservience on the colonized. It is colonialism that must bear the burden.

It must also be clear that settlements the like of Kiryat Shamouna are being established on lands that are occupied, a clear colonial act. Like our African revolutionary counterparts in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, we have signed a pact with our masses to extirpate colonialism from the face of the earth, for there is no right that the colonizer claims, which we as a force of his negation, will recognize or respect.

Let Israel be warned, that as long as there are people like Ahmad Sheikh Mahmoud (Syrian), Munir Al-Maghebi (Palestinian) and Yassir Musa Faragh Al-Mozeni (Iraqi), the revolutionary martyrs of the Kiryat Shamouna operation, that Israel can not go to sleep in peace for our revolutionaries will act as permanent reminders as to their unforgivable crimes against the Palestinian people



HAWATMEH - BURCHETT : FACT OR FANCY ?

«Tell no lies, claim no easy victories»
Amilcar Cabral

A highly respected radical French journalist published a book in 1970 in which he expressed sympathy for the Popular Democratic Front's position (*La Résistance Palestinienne*, Gerard Chaliand). His opinions of the P.F.L.P. were based on the account he heard from PDF spokesmen. We were disturbed not because Chaliand criticized us, but because we ascertained that his criticisms had a hollow base. Upon challenging his revolutionary integrity, Chaliand came to meet our leaders and cadres so as to assess the truth for himself. As a result of his visit with us, Chaliand published a long article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* « Le Double Combat du F.P.L.P. » in which he withdrew certain P.D.F. allegations and also criticized himself by admitting that some of his views expressed in the above book, concerning the P.F.L.P. were incorrect. Till now, we respect Chaliand's courage.

As of late, another well known and respected radical journalist has seemingly fallen prey to Hawatmeh's opinions. Ironically this journalist, Wilfred Burchett, based his opinions on Hawatmeh's account only and did not bother to cross check the latter's viewpoints with that of the P.F.L.P.'s. It is quite regretful that Burchett did not learn a lesson from the Chaliand experience. We wonder however, would Burchett have the moral courage to admit the inaccuracies and mistakes which he reported as facts? Though Mr. Burchett is quite well versed in Indo-Chinese affairs, a fact for which we have respected him, he possesses neither the elementary nor the rudimentary facts concerning the Middle East, and the Palestine question in particular.

However, if Mr. Burchett insists on writing on the Middle East, we suggest that a) he bridge the gap between the truthfulness of what he reports and what actually is ; b) and that the next time he finds himself in Beirut — he could seek an interview with the P.F.L.P. Who knows, perhaps he too might find the need for self-criticism after such an interview. The only thing we promise is to deal with him as we do with all progressive journalists : firm, frank honesty coupled with a revolutionary spirit that respects facts and one which knows how to differentiate between opinion and fact.

Before we dissect Burchett's reporting of the Hawatmeh interview, we would like to register our objection to the closing paragraph of Burchett's «Syria gets taste of U.S. Diplomacy» (Guardian - March 13, 1974), which if read carefully could be interpreted as a slur against the Palestinian people. He writes :

«The idea of a Palestinian state, as the first step along the road to

a full-scale national home which will embrace the 3.3 million Palestinians scattered throughout the Middle East - including about half a million in Israel itself - has been seized upon with passionate enthusiasm. It is a factor that neither Dr. Kissinger nor in his own separate way, Dr. Habash can ignore.»

Though Burchett saves himself linguistically by inserting «nor in his own separate way» to differentiate Kissinger from Habash, the mere fact of lumping the two together is an insult to our people. For as is obvious, whereas Kissinger represents the interests of U.S. Imperialism, our main enemy, Comrade Habash to our masses is respected because of his relentless militancy.

Having disposed of some preliminary remarks, let us deal directly with Burchett's interview of Hawatmeh published in the March 6, 1974 issue of the Guardian, and some of the statements of the March 13 article already cited above.

The crux of Burchett's «reporting» is concerned with the proposed Palestinian state. However, instead of reporting, he took it upon himself to offer his services as a PR man for the PDF position.

Based on interviews he conducted, he deduces that :

- Most Palestinians are in favor of the «mini-state» ;
- Most of the P.L.O. with the exception of the P.F.L.P. and the A.L.F. are for the «state» ;
- And finally, that Iraq is the actual provocator of those opposed to the «mini-state».

Though Burchett did not claim to possess scholarly abilities, we would like to remind him that even a political article requires that facts be stated even if they might be damaging to one's wishful thinking.

Firstly, how did Burchett, Hawatmeh and the West Bank dignitaries arrive at the conclusion that the masses are dying to see the establishment of a «mini-state» ? With no evidence to show, Burchett quotes Awad of the West Bank : «People in the occupied areas are unanimous for an independent state.» (Guardian, March 6, 1974). Furthermore he writes : «Among the guerillas who are doing the fighting, the opinion seems unanimous in favor of the state.» (Guardian, March 13, 1974).

In the meantime, many of the mass organizations in the Palestinian camps and elsewhere have to this day registered a categoric refusal of the proposed state. (The Workers Union, Palestinian Women's Commission, Writers Union, Student etc). To elaborate on this point, we need only look at the elections of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) held in Lebanon. Though all the elected candidates were from Fateh, it must be pointed out that the electorate knew quite well that

even these Fateh people are opposed to the Palestinian state. In fact about 70% of those elected are opposed to capitulation, hence they refuse the «mini-state». In these same elections, the P.F.L.P. candidates who were expected to receive no more than 10% of the votes received on the average 35% of the total votes.

On the other level, various petitions signed by residents of camps Ein Al-Helwa and Rashideya directed to the P.L.O. executive stated their categoric refusal of the state.

Numerous other examples can be cited to disprove Burchett's reported allegations. One wonders what type of mysterious research and analytical tools led Burchett to make such a claim ?

As to the question of the West Bank residents, we can at best describe their position as one of legitimate and justified confusion. Hence to claim they are overwhelmingly in favour of the state would be quite erroneous. It is our task as a unified P.L.O. to clarify to our masses the impact of the October war. Those who at present favor the formation of a state do so primarily because they fear that the only other available alternative is a return to Hussein's rule, a fact which they dread and which we have historically and categorically refused.

In opening the door for Hawatmeh to shed light upon us, Burchett registers the former's remarks : «We denounce demagogic and incorrect lines such as that of Habash's. His is a typical leftist opportunist line consisting of advancing strategic slogans but avoiding any practical steps to implement them. The practical results of his rejection of creating a national state would be to abandon the territories to be evacuated to Jordan's King Hussein.»

Again due to Burchett's political blinders, he falls short on the methodological end of the argument. In other words in confining himself to this limited either/or scheme («state» or Hussein), he in fact limits the possibilities at hand to a rather rigid and closed system of analysis.

- Why must the refusal of A (state) mean the automatic acceptance of B (Hussein) ?
- Is this either/or situation the only scheme within which we could operate ?
- Will the acceptance of (A) result in the defeat of the Imperialist plan being presently expounded by the U.S. through their «peace» dove, Mr. Kissinger.
- Is not the offering of (A) in fact the tool by which Imperialism hopes to silence once and for all the voices of revolution i.e., the Palestinian resistance movement personified in armed struggle ?

The real question then is not whether one is for or against (A) or (B).

rather we see that given the present balance of powers internationally and locally, that our number one aim is the exposing and stopping of the Imperialist plan - a plan whose ultimate aim is not only the extirpation of the resistance but also the elimination of the actual idea of resistance, hence revolution.

If the principal contradiction is between Imperialism and the forces of its negation, the Arab masses, then in discussing the proposed state we must first and foremost determine whose solution it is, and under what specific historical conditions is it being proposed.

Mr. Hawatmeh and Mr. Burchett, is it really «opportunistic» to request that in our analysis we invoke a major point of Marx's methodology i.e. historical specificity ? Simply put, we are not against the establishment of a Palestinian state, nor are we opposed to a «National Authority» to rule over this state. We do however have serious reservations as to the actualization of these plans in the present historical context. Furthermore based on our understanding of Imperialism, we are certain that in offering a Palestinian state, they do not do so on a silver platter. It is more like the stick and the carrot. In short, the state will be a sentinel state, a cemetery for the resistance movement.

We ask that you not confuse matters by making comparisons to the Vietnamese case when you fail to establish the proper basis upon which such a comparison can actually take place. «Our strategic aim is a democratic state in the whole land of Palestine... The strategic aim of the Vietnamese people is also to unite their country and create a democratic society. But they adopted a step-by-step process. Our approach must be similar... At this stage we are fighting to end Israel's occupation of our lands. We are fighting for Palestinian self-determination - the Israelis evacuation of the occupied land and the creation of a national democratic state.» (Hawatmeh, Guardian March 6, 1974).

The sad part of this statement is that it was said by the leader of the P.D.F., one of the Palestinian organizations, and reported by a man whom we always considered as knowledgeable concerning Vietnamese affairs. Allow us to point out that the Vietnamese in following a «step-by-step process» did so only as a result of political and military strength. They went to Paris because they had a mass armed movement at their disposal. In accepting a ceasefire they did so because they maintained the right to oppose U.S. intervention in their internal affairs, plus the PRG, a well organized revolutionary force in the southern part of Vietnam controlled (then, perhaps



ISRAEL IN CRISIS

Since the October war, Israel has been facing an internal political crisis or more accurately the October war instrumented in crystallizing the underlying contradictions of the Israeli state. A partial listing of certain incidents might be useful in pointing out the existence of the internal crisis that plagues Israel.

- January 1974 the ruling coalition loses six seats in the Knesset and the right wing Likud coalition gains seven - which makes the ruling coalition a minority government.
- February 17, 4,000 people participate in a demonstration against Moshe Dayan.
- February 21 Dayan announces his refusal to participate in the government.
- February 28, Anti Meir and Dayan chants and slogans at a funeral for those killed during the October war.
- March 3, Golda Meir announces her resignation.
- March 5, Dayan rescinds his decision of non-participation in the newly formed government.
- March 6, Meir forms a coalition government after a two months' ministerial crisis.
- March 21, Assistant Chief of Staff resigns from the army.
- March 26, 6,000 demonstrate as they demand the resignation of the government.
- April 2, The «Agronat» investigations finds David Elizar and other high ranking officers responsible for Israel's non-preparedness for the October war, his resignation follows.
- April 6, Dayan refuses to accept responsibility for the shortcomings of the October war, and refuses to resign, and demands that the government bear the total burden.
- April 8, The internal divisions of the ruling coalition lead to its fragmentation - Meir threatens with her resignation.
- April 10, Meir resigns.

This brief scenario is enough to indicate that since the October war, the political crisis in Israel has reached unbelievable proportions, as each big and small official pointed the

finger of accusation towards each other. It is true that as we write this article Rabin has already been chosen to form a new government, but in our opinion we need to probe into the **material** basis of the present crisis so as to find coherent and intelligible explanations for the crisis that Zionist settler-colonialism faces and will undoubtedly continually be subjected to.

Before we do so, we must draw your attention to two factors that

MONEY FLOWS TO ISRAEL

While the Palestine Liberation Movement receives but a pittance to carry out its revolutionary activities, Israel is smothered by the weight of bills of exchange it receives from Zionism and its agents. Here are some excerpts from a speech made by Pinhas Sapir, the Israeli Minister of Finance, and published in the *Israel Digest* (November 23, 1973).

The total of the world quotas today is one billion and three hundred million dollars for the UJA and Keren, Hayesod, through the Jewish Agency, and 650 million for Israel Bonds. We are talking about a period of 15 months from the beginning of the war until the end of 1974. In normal times we could expect during this period from 700 to 750 million dollars from both these organizations together.

I don't have to waste words on how much we need this money. Our objectives are to continue as far as possible to absorb immigration, to continue as far as possible to absorb immigration, to continue our social programs, to continue our housing plans, with stress on young couples and, of course, to continue development of the economy.

During these past weeks, we reached and exceeded the total of two and a half billion dollars in Israel Bonds sold. Of this amount, more than one billion dollars have already been redeemed. It is doubtful that in the history of the world's nations there has been an effort which succeeded in mobilizing loans in such huge sums. It is doubtful that there has ever been a time when so many people loaned money to a country under terms in which the interest paid is not measured only in percentage points but primarily in the state's achievements and its developments.

have been crystallized as a result of the existing political crises in the Zionist state of Israel.

A- The new political mood as exemplified through the numerous anti-government strikes essentially opposes the monopoly of the established political parties on public affairs;

B- Secondly, there is a lack of public confidence as regards government and press releases. For example, in a survey conducted by the Institute of Applied Research (Jerusalem) asked whether the government was doing enough to explain its decisions to the public, the results were as follow: 1) Before the war, only 49% of the sample population thought it was;

2) In mid-October, the proportion increased to 79%

3) However, by mid-December (73) the proportion had slumped to 43%.

In short, government credibility in the public eye is suffering from a high degree of lack of confidence.

It is our opinion however, that these developments are not the root of the government crisis, but a direct manifestation of the ideological, hence political, social and economic make-up of the Zionist idea. Consequently, in order to explain the present political crisis, or more precisely the crisis of Israeli colonialism, we intend to look at two factors: the economic and the social (ethnic, racial) basis i.e. the material basis of the present crisis.

To discuss these two factors, we must posit them in their proper context i.e. the backbone of Israel is the army. S. Rolbant in *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army* (N.Y. 1970 p. 296) writes:

«The Israeli army is the Israeli society, and the Israeli-society is the Israeli army. In other words, the army is not something marginal, a useful adjunct to national existence. It is the only thing that makes the state a reality. It is the beginning and the end of political existence.»

The political existence of Israel being a colonial one from the outset meant that the army would be delegated to a dual task. It was to be an internal police force, and a strik-

ing force outside the borders for reprisal raids. The major aim of this dual task after 1948 was the repression and expulsion of the remaining Palestinians so as to realize the Zionist dream (myth) of «A people without land, to a land without people». Furthermore, with the increasing need of militarism so as to enforce and forge the existence of a Zionist state based on racialism, exclusivism, expansionism required that the army play a major role in all spheres and domains of Israeli society.

This factor explains the large number of military men who have entered public political life. (This topic requires a separate article, so we will be satisfied by pointing it out without elaboration).

More importantly, the central role of the army has meant that a large portion of the economy would be attached to military expenditures (notice the similarity to the U.S.). For example, by the end of 1970, between half and two-thirds of the labour force derived at least a major part of its income from the security budget. Between 80,000 and 100,000 workers in the civilian market lived directly from the security budget. Israeli defense industries manufactured goods worth IL 300 million in 1967. This figure jumped to IL 1,300 million in 1970 i.e. over four times that of 1967. Furthermore, it is expected to reach IL 2,600 million by 1975.

Israeli militarism, hence expansionism has meant that new territories would have to be administered. This meant that the Army would essentially form a quasi-government in the occupied territories so as to effectively implement their colonization program. Such a venture of course was instrumental in elucidating the contradiction between the colonizer and his victim, the Palestinian. (This contradiction gave birth to sentiments of National Liberation, hence armed struggle.)

This colonization program after the 1967 war provided the Israeli economy with an unprecedented boom. This economic boom i.e. capitalist development was inevitably accompanied by the uneven development between the oriental vs. occidental sectors of Israel, resulting in social conflicts that caught the attention of world public opinion by the numerous labor strikes in the 70's and the rise of an oriental movement demanding social justice e.g. the Black Panthers of Israel.

Before the October war, the Israeli economy though following an inflationary trend did not feel the negative aspects of inflation due to the economic boom that the economy was experiencing. The October war however came, and with it the boom was halted, and the economic and social

conflicts within the Israeli state began to surface. These conflicts were expressed through the earlier discussed political developments in Israel. It is important to point out that these conflicts have always existed in Israel since its inception though latent at times.

The economic crisis of Israel was summarized quite succinctly by a background paper presented by pro-Zionist American professors for Peace in the Middle East, Oct. 16, 1973. They wrote:

«Without the war, Israel would have had a deficit of total uses over GNP of about \$1.7 billion, or 30% of the GNP, which would have had to be made up by gifts and investment. With the new costs caused by the war expense, lack of industrial and agricultural production because of mobilization, and replacement of lost supplies and infrastructure, the deficit of total uses over GNP for the next year may well mount to \$2.75 billion, or 46% of the GNP; for the following year it may be \$3.3 billion, or 52% of GNP.» (p. 191.)

By election time 1973, aside from «security» issues, the public mood was mostly focusing on internal problems, summarized in the following by Maier Asher of the Daily Telegraph October 23, 1973: «These were the social gap between Israel's relatively prosperous Western community and the lagging Oriental community representing half of the nation; the inequality in educational opportunity; inflation, poverty and sub-standard housing affecting almost a quarter of the nation.»

The October war then marks the end of an unprecedented economic boom that began in 1967, in which the average Israeli made more money than ever before and spent it as fast as he made it on cars, television sets and travel abroad. In addition, this economic boom has clearly increased

the gap between the have's and the have nots.

In general terms the war has caused a cut in private demand which will result in lowering the standard of living of the Israelis by at least 10% over the next. The British Guardian writes:

«Taking into consideration the previously anticipated rise in per capita income consumption of six per cent to eight per cent in real terms, it means Israelis will have to spend at least 16% less than they had expected.» In the meantime, the Israeli-Economist (Oct.-Nov. 1973) estimates that «Next year defense spending is liable to go up to between 15-18% of resources, with about IL 3,000 million worth of home output, IL 3,000 million being diverted from other purposes to defense.»

In addition GNP is likely to grow only by 3-5% as compared to 8-9% before the war. In practical terms this means that not only consumption will suffer but investment as well. Such trends have caused an unprecedented increase in prices which has offset the wage increase of the average worker. It must be pointed out however that such trends are not exclusively due to the October war. In April 1973 the cost of living index went up 3.9% according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. That was the highest monthly increase in the last 20 years. During the first four months of 1973, the index went up 9.5%. This can only mean that while business in Israel was booming, the average worker's buying power was in permanent decline. After the war, prices of commodities such as rice increased by 50%, meat by 30-50% and clothes and shoes by 50%.

With the increase of prices, wages have also been on the rise, but profits were improving more rapidly, of course. For example, in 1972 production per hour of work increased by 17% while wages per unit of output increased by only 2.4% (reminiscent of Marx's i.e. rate of exploitation in actual terms is increasing.) Viewed from another angle, wages as a proportion of national income fell from 77% in 1971 to 74% in 1972, whereas the average yield of capital in the same period rose from 9.9 per cent to 10.9 per cent.

After the October war, in November, the consumer price index went up by 4.4% surpassing the April 1973 all time high. This increase meant that prices of foodstuffs, fuel, electricity, clothing etc. skyrocketed anywhere from a 30% to 100% increase.

To sum, the increasing impoverishment of the average Israeli, coupled with a loss of confidence in government policy both in the economic and

military spheres have been the material bases of the present political conflict.

Before we draw some general conclusions let us look at price increases in the occupied territories as recorded by the Quarterly Journal of Statistics of the Administered Territories, (1973 v. 4).

The consumer general price index in Judea and Samaria (Base: July 1960-June 1969 = 100.0) for the years 1970-1972 were 108.4, 125.9, 148.1 respectively. For the year 1973 prices skyrocketed.

The figures below are a comparison between the first and last month of 73'.

Poultry	Meat	Total	Rice	Flour	Bread	Total	Fruit & Vegetables	General Index	
135.1	181.3	173.6	135.7	128.7	117.5	123.3	216.5	159.1	I 1973
170.8	236.3	226.3	264.8	179.4	138.0	169.8	236.5	201.5	XII 1973
Household Maintenance		I 1973		Footwear	Clothes	I 1973			
150.1		XII 1973		185.5	154.4	XII 1973			
209.3				236.6	195.7				
Health Services		Transport							
Doctor's Services & Medicines		Gasoline		Taxi Fare	Bus Fare	Total			
153.1				114.7	128.4	126.3	I 1973		
182.8				181.1	162.9	171.6	XII 1973		

It is obvious that those who pay the price of the continuation and expansion of Zionism are firstly the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, and those in exile. Secondly, the average Israeli who is seeking security is paying the price but not for peace and security, rather for continued Israeli expansion and aggression. These elementary economic facts will have to be used by any progressive minded Jew in order to come to the sober conclusion that the essence of the Zionist state will provide him with an abundance of insecurity for which he pays the price (notice the paradox).

To further illustrate the increasing gap between the haves and the have nots, let us look at the following example as to how the Israeli government encourages such a disparity. The «Encouragement of Capital Investments (capital intensive companies) 1973 law a Pinhas Sapir approved proposal provides special privileges over and above the benefits of an approved enterprise to foreign investment companies provided they raise \$30 million of equity in three years. They will get a 30 year exemption from income tax on dividends. The International corporation for the development of Israel (Incodi), a group of German Jewish investors, the first to benefit from the above law will also enjoy considerable concessions under the West German encouragement of foreign investments law. So while wages and in general cost of living are suffering compared to the increase in the rate of corporate profits, large corporations are getting tax exemptions never realized before.

So with open arms we greet David Spanier's dismay (London-Times-«Zionism in search of new bearings»): «All of a sudden it seems blindingly clear, not to all, but to many who have somehow looked the other way, that the permanent relegation of large numbers of people as second class citizens will bring the Zionist mission to an end and may threaten the state itself.» Indeed Mr. Spanier, as the internal contradictions of the Zionist state crystallize the door will open for the dissolution of Zionism and the creation of the democratic state where Jews (both oriental and Ashkenazism), Muslims and Christians will live in security rather than foot

the bill of permanent insecurity emanating from Zionism's inherent need of exclusivism, expansionism and racialism.

To eliminate the racialism inherent in Israel's occidental spirit, we must eliminate the mentality that expounds the following: «So far from regarding our immigrants from Oriental countries as a bridge toward our intergration with the Arab-speaking world, our object should be to infuse them with an Occidental spirit, rather than to allow them to drag us into an unnatural orientation.» (Eban) (Sic)

It is clear that the present crisis is deeply rooted in the socio-economic crisis that Israeli society keeps regenerating. In the post October 73 period, Israel is less secure than ever before, more dependent on Imperialism (U.S.) both economically and militarily. These developments are juxtaposed with a move to the right i.e. on ascent of the right. The problem however is that neither the «right» nor the labour party nor any Zionist agency can resolve the present conflict. They can only provide a patch up job until Zionism's negation i.e. the Palestinian resistance movement develops into a veritable people's movement divorced of all forms of chauvinism and armed with revolutionary socialism. Such a development can only help to intensify the class struggle in Israel ultimately leading the progressive Jews to free themselves from both Zionism and Imperialism.





JORDAN : REFUGE, SANCTUARY OR CEMETERY FOR PALESTINIANS

« The Jordanians and Palestinians are a single, united, inseparable Arab people bound by unbreakable historic ties. They were woven together from the same fabric and infused with the same spirit of the Arab nation. They were fused jointly by a social milieu that gave them an Arab identity, a distinctive personality, and, a humanitarian consciousness. They were steeled in peoplehood in their struggle for liberty and independence. As a people, they have had nothing to do with their foreign-anointed rulers the Hashemite, Hejazi tribesmen. The latter were imposed by the British on southern Syria as a recompense for services rendered during the First World War. The British have been sent packing. The Hashemites too will follow in their footsteps as the revolution wrests the land from its predators!»

Abu Salem

In the colonial scheme of things, the British conceived of the creation of an Israeli state in the Arab midst as a wedge to keep the Arab East and West divided and apart. Israel's role was even more specific : it was an adjunct, a gendarme to a colonial power whose vital communications routes went through the area and whose investments and markets dominated it. But then, the creation of Israel posed a problem. Such a question did not enter the Zionist mind because it contradicted its preconceived ideology : Palestine, to the Zionists, was a land without a people, which was being sought for a people without a land, for the purpose of «ingathering the exiles».

Therefore, when Winston Churchill,

minister for the colonies, conferred on prince Abdullah ibn Ali, the land beyond the Jordan (1921), Ben Gurion, the Zionist protagonist, protested strenuously on the grounds that the principality was an integral part of the hoped for Jewish «national home». Thereupon, the christian-zionist-colonialist Churchill averred that the creation of Jordan was essential for the execution of the zionist program : Jordan was intended as a place of refuge for the dispersed Palestinians. At roughly the same time, the astute Churchill decreed that Haj Amin El-Husseini be appointed trustee over the Palestinians and grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, zionist settlement proceeded apace and Jewish immigration to Palestine multiplied as self-government was instituted. Thus from the early twenties onward, we see the seeds of future conflict set in motion, manifesting itself in three contending forces :

1) We have foreign interlopers coming mainly from Europe to claim Palestine, but unlike the white racist regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and elsewhere, their spokesman, the World Zionist Organization (1897), «the founding father» of Israel aimed at the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as Jewish as Britain was British. That is, the Jewish state was to have an absolute Jewish majority and a subservient-helot Arab minority. Consequently, the minimum program of the zionists was the occupation of British mandated Palestine (once the British enunciated the Balfour Declaration, Nov. 2, 1917, which promised a Jewish home in Palestine and the protection of the non-Jewish population ; the League of Nations conferred the mandate on Britain, 1922, as a «sacred trust» and classi-

fied Palestine as class A, which meant, Palestine should be granted self-government and that the mandatory power should assist her in achievement of independence.). Secondly, the intermediate program of the Zionists was the takeover of Palestine proper and Transjordan ; and thirdly, their maximum program, or what may be termed the Manifesto of the Greater Israel Movement was the proclamation of an Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.

2) Although prince Abdullah was from the outset a creature of the British and in the historic strategic sense, he and his successors, did their biddings, he nevertheless had aspirations of his own and had he been able to concretize them, the area would have witnessed the birth of «the fertile crescent state» which would have included Jordan, Palestine, Syria and perhaps eventually Lebanon and Iraq. Since his brother Feisal was overthrown by the French and his Syrian Arab kingdom was eliminated after 22 months (July 23, 24, 1920, in the Battle of Maysaloun) of precarious governance, Abdullah hoped to establish a foothold in Trans-Jordan, rule Palestine in collaboration with the British and Jews, then recover Syria from the French in order to redeem Hashemite honor, and if possible, restore the kingdom to his already British enthroned brother Feisal, in Iraq.

3) Finally, there was the hapless Palestinians, the southern Syrians, the Pan-Arabists, whom the British and Hashemites had thought of as subjects to be ruled over and the Zionists had expunged from their memories. The Palestinians, the proponents of the Arab party, did not think of themselves as Palestinians in

terms of nationality, the Zionists and imperialist however, forced them to do so and thereby pushed them into the trough of evolving regionalism and developing parochial nationalism ; in part, the Palestinians thought of themselves as Arabs first and foremost and sought with the help of their fellow Pan-Arabists to establish an Arab nation-state in the Arab East as a minimum and throughout the Arab World, if possible. The Arab party, the torch bearer of the Great Arab Revolt of 1916, was the forerunner of Baathism in the 1940's, Nasserism in the 1950's and 60's and Arab Marxian socialism of the 1970's and coming decades. In the 1920's traditional colonialism and imperialism had their own plans for the Arab people. In order to secure and maintain their domination, the imperialists immediately set out to break up the inherited administrative apparatus of the Ottoman empire and divided unified Syria various regions and allocated portions among themselves in accordance with the prearranged conspiracy against the Arab nation, known as «the Sykes-Picot Agreement». The British and the French, not the Arab people were destined to rule the East for the next generation. And as they ruled, the colonial masters strengthened and solidified the Levantine comprador class, the feudal effendis and created for themselves an administrative stratum that mimicked everything British and French, from manners to morals, from attire to ideology, from game to religious worship : they became a class of evolus, an Arab elite devoid of Arabism, a Frenchified-Anglicized Arab corps whose heads were in France and Britain and whose bodies were in Damascus and Jerusalem. Those evolues taught their fellow «citizens» French and British culture, Cartesian philosophy, British utilitarianism, and, in due course, their successors preached Yankee pragmatism and European civility. The world was in the morose and morass conditions of imperialism zionism-regionalism. And the newly spawned multitudes of nationalisms and nationalists interlocked, intermingled, and interacted: leaders and movements erupted on the scene and imperialism pronounced all was good, with some exceptions. In the midst of imperialist euphoria, the idea of the Arab nation-state was dead, the leadership was dissipated, the movement was moribund, only the memory remained, and that is what mattered to an historic people.

Returning to the central question before us - Jordan, it ought to be remembered that all the Abdullahs and Ben-Gurions had the same British sponsor, mentor, master. But it should be pointed out that evolution is an inexorable law of nature and,

therefore, today's offspring could become tomorrow's gorilla and so it was with the Zionist movement which stood at the master's gate as a mendicant in the 1920's, haunted him in the 30's, then hunted him down in the mid-40's and sent him packing shortly thereafter. The Palestinians, unhappily for themselves, were not so favoured by the gods. In fact, they participated in a play scripted by others, whose stage-managers were invisible, whose players were adept professionals titillating bystanders, observers and amateur actors. It was thus preordained that the hero of the piece was doomed and the spectators could only offer sympathy, shed a tear or two over his humanity or offer an apology for their failure to come to his assistance. Consequently, conscience money had to be paid in the form of crumbs embodied in UN-RWA and its rations.

More specifically, Abdullah and Ben-Gurion almost simultaneously launched their projects and achieved their goals: a) Abdullah commenced in April, 1923, and was granted local autonomy by the British and by 1946, his full independence was recognized; b) Ben-Gurion's Jewish Agency was acknowledged as the «sole representative» of the Jewish people in Palestine (1928), and as the executive of the Jewish state, May 15, 1948, whose premier became none other than the «indomitable» Ben-Gurion. In retrospect, the «titanic» struggles that were waged and culminated in the attainment of independence for Abdullah and Ben-Gurion, the extrusion of the Palestinians, the defeat of the Arab states in the first Arab-Israel conflict, all appear as minor skirmishes, or, at best, battles at the nadir of a mountain that has yet to be conquered. But from the perspective of the participants, the «titanic» struggles were indeed «titanic». Here was a disorganized, leaderless, amorphous mass of Palestinians, attempting to defend its birthrights against a formidable set of enemies and against great odds. Those who paraded themselves as leaders and misled the people, such as Haj Amin were imposed upon the people, but he nevertheless succeeded in asserting his leadership for awhile and had the opportunity to expose himself - as he did - when the uprising of 1936-39 by passed him. At this juncture, his notorious Arab party intervened, bridled the revolt, contained it and finally, uprooted it with the help of the British, the Jewish Agency and its constables, the Arab states and their Nuri Es Said, and, King Abdullah and his Palestinian Defense Party and its «peace Regiments». Abdullah, Ben-Gurion and Haj Amin were «the holy trinity», the Arab states, the British and their well-wishers were the «peace-ma-

kers». Palestine was partitioned in 1937 and the UN with the help of the British and the midwifery of America, sanctioned it on Nov. 29, 1947, when the Palestinian exodus began in earnest and the «ingathering of the exiles» surged forward forming Roman phalanxes, leaving in their wake Amazons of blood seas anguished humanity that took refuge in Abdullah's patrimony. At last, his dream was realized: he annexed the West Bank and had his friend, El-Jaabari, convene a congress at Jericho (Sept. 1949) to confer it upon him and recognize Abdullah as the King of Palestine. The Arab states acquiesced and shared in the largesse and Palestine was sold for less than 30 pieces of silver and divided as the lord's garments were divided among his persecutors: the West Bank went to Jordan, Gaza to Egypt, Himmah to Syria.

In their new places of refuge, the Palestinians posed only social problems such as housing, health, education, welfare, etc. They did not constitute a threat to anyone; they did not represent a force to be reckoned with; their presence merely reminded their tormentors of their inhumanity and exposed the «Arabs» to ridicule and contempt the world over. It was therefore thought by those concerned, that at last, a «final solution» was at hand for the Unfortunately however, for King Abdullah, he did not live long enough to enjoy the fruits of his labor; he was made king of Palestine by the Congress of Jericho (Sept. 1949) convened at his behest by Al-Jaabari and co. but he was assassinated in the summer of 1951 by a Palestinian in the Al-Aska mosque, and his grandson, King Hussein ascended the throne on May 2, 1952. Hussein, as it turned out, was indeed the grandson of his grandfather: he too, had a «final solution» for the Palestinians and thrust himself into the «sacred» task with great verve and determination. In consonance with the imperialist-zionist plan, the Palestinians had to be integrated into the neighboring Arab states and assimilated by the ocean of Arab humanity. In other word, Palestinian; the identity, Palestinian; the mode of thought, Palestinian had to be eliminated and Palestinian peoplehood severed and buried in a graveyard of revolting local nationalisms. And Palestine was to be submerged and remade in the image of Zionism. As a result, the Johnson plan, which was a scheme to divide the Jordan River waters among «neighbors» was proposed and contact was made with the Sharett government of Israel (1954) with a view to achieving a final settlement and a lasting peace for the region. A token of 50,000 Palestinians were to be repatriated and the other 700,000

were to be «compensated». This scheme provoked the religious wrath of zealot Zionists, who leapt from the underground and toppled Sharett before the «treacherous» scheme saw the light of day. «No», shouted Ben-Gurion and company, we've already achieved a modus operandi, a swap, that is. Palestinians have been exchanged for Arab Jews who came to Israel from Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Unhappily for Hussein and Co., Ben-Gurion's revolt foreclosed the possibility of an Arab-Israeli «peace», except on completely Zionist terms.

Though the young Hussein was the de jure ruler of Jordan, his mother Zein and her brother, Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil, were the de facto rulers. As experienced courtiers, they, in collaboration with Sir John Glubb, the British commander of the Arab Legion, or the Jordanian army, which was reawakened by the tremors that shook the Arab East in the aftermath of the first Arab-Israeli conflict resulted in the assassination of Abdullah in Jordan and, a «bloodless» coup in Egypt by the Free Officers Association, presided over by Nasser. In the new environment, British and American influences countervailed each other in Jordan (1953-1957); the situation in the palace seemed comparatively stable; the national movement however, was recovering from the shock of Palestine and new horizons became more visible and greater possibilities were open. The British did not understand what was happening but resolved to strengthen their hold on Jordan, by attempting to include her in Nato's proposed extension, the Mideast Defense plan, that was finally embodied in the Baghdad pact (1955). Such foreign encroachments antagonized the National Movement which seized the opportunity not only to oppose and frustrate those foreign-inspired plans, but also to combat imperialism in the area and to propose two Arab alternatives: Baathism and Nasserism. The activities of the rampaging nationalists were not relished by the court and its hangers-on. However, in the crucible of battle, Hussein made a «significant» concession: he fired his personal friend and protector, Sir John (March 2, 1956). This deed and others, instead of assuaging and mollifying the nationalists, inflamed them further, especially after the nationalization of Suez (July 26, 1956) and the rise of Nasser to stardom. Thereupon, Hussein the shrewd little king, jumped on the bandwagon and sabre-rattled along with his fellow kings and colonels in the Suez crisis (Oct. 29 - Nov. 5, 1956). Moreover, as the Arab states retrenched and the anti-communist, right-wing protective umbrella, the Eisenhower Doctrine was proclaimed (Jan 7,

1957), Hussein de-escalated his Arab nationalism and escalated his Husseinism. By April of 1957, the head-on collision between him and the National Movement was resolved in his favor; the nationalists either landed in El-Jafr prison, skipped town, or were killed; Hussein alone remained supreme in Amman. The same process was repeated in 1966, and 1970. In each case, the movement paid a heavier price, but Hussein and the Hashemites got even closer to their graves and their inevitable demise.

In 1957, as Turkey mobilized to challenge the tide of Arab nationalism and threatened to invade Syria; as Nasserism assumed the mantle of Arab leadership and propelled the nationalist forces onward; and, as Baathism yielded the right of way to Nasserism and accepted its leadership, Nasser and Aflaq, the Baathist ideologue and founder, leapt into the mainstream of history and jointly fused the United Arab Republic (Feb. 22, 1958) and invited the entire Arab nation to partake in the sacrament of unity. The Hashemites, instead of joining the union, formed a federation of their own and tried to become the magnet of the right-wing regimes under imperialist instigation and prodding. Unluckily, for Hussein however, the Iraqi people dethroned his cousin Feisal, and his regent Abdul II-Lah and his hangman Nuri Es-Said, and almost marched on Amman to liberate it from Hussein. Here the British and Americans showed their mettle; the latter landed their marines in Lebanon to protect their running-dog, Chamoun, and the former parachuted themselves into Amman to safeguard their scion, Hussein, the «nobleman soldier». Hussein and Chamoun were rescued; the «redoubtable» Hussein became ever indispensable. It took nearly another decade before the National Movement revived and was instantly crushed; shortly afterwards however, the third Arab-Israeli conflict intervened and resulted in Hussein's deprivation of the West Bank and the denudation and exposure of the entire Arab leadership.

Hussein's failure to integrate the Palestinians and provide them with the kind of refuge required of him was given added grist by the great influx of Palestinians into Jordan as a result of the June war. The new mass of twice dislocated refugees reminded the semi-stabilized population of Jordan of Israel's nearness and their prospective future should Israel continuously prevail. Furthermore, since the idols that had promised liberation and restoration of rights had fallen, it became incumbent upon the National Movement to take up the gauntlet, assert its leadership and seize the times in order



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to proclaim a new Palestinian humanity. Besides, the Arab masses were longing for action and hoping for an angry riposte against the enemy as the Nasserite leadership lost its moral authority and proved itself incapable of defending the nation. Hence it followed that any would-be leader must resume the struggle against the enemy and derive his legitimacy from the battle field, not from the verbal violence of the public rally. It is at this point that the resistance came on the scene bringing forward tidings of liberation and thereby smashing through the columns of despair and the fortresses of disillusioned expectations. The resistance in battle gave the Arab man and the Palestinians in particular a sense of historic worth and mission and a feeling of proud identity. However, father's inability - as the self-proclaimed Dockhane - to provide an historic substitute and a program to implement it, would in a matter of years place the resistance movement in the same historic dilemma that engulfed the Arab regimes in the aftermath of the June war and rendered it a skeletal entity with an army of civil servants fighting for territory, not revolutionaries fighting for liberation.

Meanwhile, the resistance grew by leaps and bounds, especially in the 1968-1970 period. As turned out, it was not able to assimilate the volunteers that flooded its offices, nor did it form a unified front to confront the enemy, train the friend and protest the rear. Put simply, the resistance considered Jordan a sanctuary, a safe haven and a home base where it acted with impunity to promote the national interest and the common cause; and the Fatehites seemed to have forgotten or refused to remember what Hussein is and was, how he fitted into the imperialist-zionist plan and what he would do had he the power to revert to his historically assigned role. Furthermore as the resistance encrusted its identity with armed struggle and became a mass magnet, the Arab governments both «left» and «right», enveloped it in a halo of holiness and stamped it with the seal of redemption and prophetic vision. Even Hussein proclaimed himself a commando and Fateh believed him and sought co-existence under his umbrella. The Arab leaders and their mouthpieces also hailed the new renaissance as an historic turning-point and compared it to a new beginning in Islam. However, being without an historic vision or a class preception of reality, the plaudits of spectators went into Fateh's head: it believed its own hyperboles and the ballad-mongers that surrounded it. Such was indeed the source of its glory and the cause of its downfall.

Stated differently, the «backbone» of the resistance became too self-enamored, righteous and arrogant and its Hilton-bound jet set diplomats became publicly known by both their real names and noms de guerre at the same time. Consequently, as Hussein recovered his elan, rebuilt and reorganized his army, he started to unleash his mod dogs and finally infiltrated the movement and destroyed it from within and without: dual authority was wiped out in a sea of blood (Sept. 16-27, 1970) in Amman and Abu Ammar, the supreme commander bridged it with a handshake and a brotherly embrace of Hussein (Sept. 27, 1970 in Cairo at the Arab summit which president Nassér had called to stop the bloodshed among the «brothers»). In spite of the disaster, Abu Ammar declared victory over Hussein (Oct. 12, 1970) as his representative Ibrahim Bakr, the presently prosperous Jordanian lawyer of Amman negotiated the surrender of the cities, the disarming of the militia, the abandonment of the sanctuary. Moreover Kamal Adwan, had the audacity to call for the elimination of the Popular Front (Jan. 17, 1971) and the liquidation of the entire left unless it submitted to Hussein's demands for the disbandment of the People's Militia, the surrender of «heavy» weaponry and the evacuation of the cities. Put unequivocally, the sanctuary had become a cemetery and the leadership's orations were no more than funeral hymns that it sang as triumphal dirges for the unresurrected dead and the trail of martyrs left behind show that it was on a course of suicidal collusion. Since the Arab states regarded the resistance as a pressuring and negotiable card on the peaceful road to «political settlement», it followed that the card could be discarded once it no longer served a useful purpose. This in fact is what had happened before and since the Sept. Massacre. That is, the hands-off policy adopted by Arab governments is best illustrated by reference to the complete elimination of the resistance in Jordan (July 13-20, 1971) and the international Zionist campaign to liquidate the resistance. In the first instance, the Arab governments didn't even go through the motion of protest, calling for a conference or denouncing the deed. They implicitly encouraged Hussein by their silence and Sadat certainly gave impetus to the fascist tide in the region when he bared his teeth in Sudan and helped overturn the fledgeling Attalah progressive movement there. Secondly, as regards the Zionist campaign to stamp out «terrorism», the Arab regimes stood hands folded, - if one were to rule out the possibility of conspiracy with Israel - as Israeli

agents gunned down three resistance leaders, Kamal Nasser Yusif Najjar, Kamal Adwan, on April 10, 1973 in the fashionable Beirut district of Verdun, less than 100 meters from the Lebanese gendarme headquarters where 16 tanks stood idly by.

Put succinctly, it seems in retrospect, as if the resistance did not perceive the distinction between strategic and tactical support rendered it by the Arab states. And if it did, it must have glossed the distinctions over and failed to grasp the implications of its stance and to act accordingly. But at the objective level, if armed struggle were a strategy that inevitably placed the Arab regimes in the enemy's camp, the resistance most definitely did not act as if it were conscious of this position. Moreover, if it always considered itself an ally or a junior partner of the regimes, it must be concluded that the resistance deceived itself and its followers and forfeited its historic right to lead the masses in the battle for liberation. If so, the humble status, the resistance accepted for itself during and since the October war is easily explainable. It could consequently be argued that the prodigal son had returned to the fold and he ought to be given preeminence at his father's feast. In this case, the PLO, the creature of Arab summitry (1964) which was chartered without sovereignty and trusteeship over the West Bank, Gaza and Himmah is being accorded such a status and paraded as the «sole representative of the Palestinians» (the charter of the PLO was revised at the Frouth Congress in Feb. 1968, when Fateh took over the ramshackled organization and refashioned it in its own image). In other words, the Palestinians are being granted recognition by the Arab regimes in return for services rendered since 1967, not because of the strategic identity of interests. Thus the PLO leadership is basking in the sunshine of visibility and enjoying the pleasures of stateless statehood without ever liberating a single inch of territory. More dangerously, those power-intoxicated capitulationists are riding on the dead bodies of 35000 Palestinians, 20,000 prisoners and tens of thousands of maimed and wounded.

At any rate, since Hussein transformed his sanctuary into a cemetery for the resistance, he set out to reestablish his credibility by offering the United Arab Kingdom plan as an alleged counterpose to that of Allon's, the Zionist deputy Prime Minister. Allon's plan is very simple: he would like to turn over to Hussein the Palestinian people and take over their land. He also sees in Hussein a partner who could protect Israel internally by continuously clamping down on the Palestinians and conceives of Is-

rael as Jordan's external protector who could keep Jordan's enemies at bay or should they be tempted, Israel would take care of business. On the other hand, Hussein's UAK plan (it was announced on March 15, 1972), consists of three non-optional options that all dovetail with his past plans and that of Allon's:

1) Complete independence (which he doesn't favor); 2) Federation with Jordan (that is, back to Hussein's bosom); and, 3) reintegration with Jordan (back to the idyllic status quo ante in the camps, the Beduin Soldiery and the repressions that prevail in the Jordanian - Palestinian House.).

While the Allon - Hussein plans were being bandied about, Hussein posed himself in Jordanian, Arab and other right-wing circles as a continuation of the Great Revolt and the Man capable of effecting victory in unity and freedom. He also defended his UAK plans and the unity of the two Banks as the symbol of true Arab unity and the core of greater unity among the Arab states. He insisted that he was prepared to forgive his enemies for their past misdemeanors and reintegrate them into his capitalist, freedom-loving state which opposes «destructive socialism, deviationism and atheism.» Because of this American-inspired plan, he dispatched emissaries to the West and Arab states to preach the new gospel. Responding to this overtures, the Arab states put an end to their policy of «isolating» Hussein and invited Jordan to attend the Kuwait conference of Foreign and Defence Arab ministers (Nov. 15, 1972). And in less than one year later (Sept. 10, 1973) Hussein was conferring with Sadat and Assad in Cairo on how to coordinate their peace plans and continue the struggle to reach a «political solution» with Israel. By Sept. 18, 1973, Hussein had overcome all barriers and declared «amnesty for his imprisoned subjects in the grand manner of royalty and fatherly lovingness, and called for reconciliation again with «honest» revolutionaries. For this and other reasons, he had told *Oui* magazine (Jan., 1973), «My dreams concern the Arab people and the Arab world, not myself.» And he added: «I have never let my personal interests influence my actions.»

The «courageous» King was described by the *Oui* editor as a Western man, «educated in Britain and married to an English woman - princess Mona» - and observed further: «Hussein naturally turns to the West for help. Although proud of his people and heritage, he is immersed in Western culture - from the clothes he wears to the motorcycles he rides to the music he listens to.» Commenting on Hussein's rehabilitation and his return

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to the Arab fold last September, Eric Silvers of the *Guardain* (Sept. 29, 1973) stated: «Hussein was ostracised because he put Jordan first. His prime concern was the interests of his subjects as he saw them: the perpetuation of Hashemite rule, the development of agriculture in the Jordan valleys, the maintenance of contact and commerce between the East Bank and the occupied West.

If that meant acquiescing in the fact of a Jewish state, he would take the psychological leap. If it meant bowing to Israel's insistence that Arab Governments control guerillas, he would bow.

In the past 12 months both Lebanon and Syria have been forced to accept the same Israeli doctrine. The Northern borders have been quiet for most of this year. The fedayeen are denied a springboard for sabotage, and their increasingly desperate actions outside the Middle East have embarrassed and alienated most Arab regimes.

Syria which has always kept the guerillas on a tight leash, has felt no compunction this week about closing their radio station and arresting Palestinians for distributing leaflets. Hussein, it seems, had a point.»

Returning to Hussein's past, it must be underlined that he never lagged behind his fellow Arab leaders on the peace front. Yuval Elizur, the Zionist author, reported to the *International Herald Tribune* from Jerusalem (Aug. 27, 1972) that: «Despite official statements to the contrary by Jordan's King Hussein and by Israeli Premier Golda Meir, it is firmly believed here that Jordan and Israel have recently sent out feelers to each other to study the reaction to the terms of a possible separate peace between the two countries.»

Quotations regarding separate or partial peace with Israel prior to the October war abound and we need not cite any more of them, but Hussein's stance on the Palestinian question must be noted: he remains so ruthless that he told *Le Monde* (Dec. 11, 1973) that he believed that there was still a chance for «coexistence between the Palestinian resistance and the Hashemite throne. This armed conflict never opposed the Palestinian and Jordanian peoples. It was a conflict between groups of anarchists divided among themselves and who only sought the destruction of the Jordanian regime.»

Continuing in his treasonous policy of collaborating with the Israelis, fighting the national movement and suppressing opposition at home, Hussein gave an interview to the *Associated Press* that reported (Dec. 31, 1973): «King Hussein is anxious to seize the opportunity to reassert au-

thority over the occupied land, but worried that negotiators might want to carve an independent Palestine out of what he still regards as part of his realm.

His fight to keep the area under his Hashemite Crown has forced him into a parallel policy with Israel, which is also battling Arab demands for Palestinian autonomy there.

Israel fears a Palestinian state would be internally unstable a focus of outside interests and a potential trigger of new Middle East explosions. Some Western officials in Amman share the Israeli reservations.»

The AP added further: «Premier Golda Meir has made it clear her Israeli government could live with a return of much of the territory and its 640,000 residents to Hussein's control, provided:

— The border is altered to eliminate Jordanian bulges that jutted into Israel before the 1967 occupation.

— Israel retains a string of strategic settlements on the frontier.

— The area is demilitarized.

But the first steps of Jordania officials back into the West Bank are sure to create new protests from Palestinian «hardliners» and add to their distrust of Hussein. Taking into consideration the possible loss of the West Bank, Hussein contends, according to the AP, that «his» Jordan can survive alone though he does not anticipate the possibility: «But this does not reflect my feelings regarding the very, very strong ties that exist between the one family that has existed throughout history. I think these feelings are shared by Palestinians and Jordanians alike. These ties are too strong, and I believe will remain so in the end.» Concluding its interview, AP, underscores Jordanian policies which include «a determined effort to try to 'win the hearts and minds' of the West Bankers before liberation» and adds «Jordan has resumed paying salaries of civil servants there and has facilitated travel again for Gaza Strip Arabs going to Mecca on pilgrimage.»

Several well informed sources here say hundreds of thousands of Jordanian dinars - worth slightly over 3 dollars apiece - were sent secretly to the West Bank recently for undercover distribution.» Finally, we come to the crucial question of representation and who represents the Palestinians, Hussein, the Arab states or the PLO.

It appears that since the 7th Arab Summit conference at Algiers (Nov. 27-29, 1973) recognized the PLO as the «sole representative» of the Palestinians, as did the non-aligned states (Sept. 5-8, 1973, Algiers Conference) the Islamic Summit at Lahore (Feb. 22-24, 1974) as well as

103 states, according to Abu Ammar, it is patently clear that Hussein is the only remaining «Arab» recalcitrant besides Israel and her American and Western allies. Whether or not Hussein recognizes the PLO may be historically immaterial, but if he does, his deed will take account of his personal and royal interests first and Arab and Palestinian interests second. His attitude was most decidedly revealed in a speech he made before his private parliament (Dec. 1, 1973): «Awarding the representation of our people to others means barring us from guaranteeing the rights of our people on the West Bank.» and this the «good» king could not concede. But the «realistic» king told the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Siyassa* (Dec. 3, 1973) that he knew of an American school of thought in «the U.S. Administration which sought to solve the Palestine problem by 'giving the Palestinians an alternative homeland such as the East Bank of Jordan! He encountered this school of thought during his visit to the U.S. after the 1970 civil war in Jordan, and it may be still existing today'. But the King said, this trend could not possibly realize its aim, because it is always confronted by the right of the Palestinian people to its Palestinian soil.' He added, 'the creation of an alternative Palestinian homeland is always obstructed by this reality, which is the basis of the Palestinian's national feelings.'»

The existence of an American school that contends that Hussein is dispensable and disposable was glaringly revealed in the most recent abortive Jordanian army «rebellion» (Feb. 3-4, 1974) which forced Hussein to defer his fifth visit to Kingpin Nixon from Feb. 8 to March 12, 1974. The «rebellion» was apparently an attempted palace coup that aimed not at replacing Hussein but at the Jordanization of Jordan. That is, Prince Hassan, Hussein's brother regent, his mother Zein and his uncle Sharif Nasser would like to rid themselves of the Palestinian «burden» and yield the West Bank to the Palestinians a move that was instigated by the U.S. embassy in Amman as was finally clearly insinuated in *An Nahar* (Feb. 18, 1974). The so-called «isolationist» or the Jordanization wing at the palace, fomented the 40th and 60th army brigades under the guise of economic strike, which escalated to include political demands that required the removal of Hussein's «Arab» face or the elimination of the «Arabist» wing: the government of Zeid Rifaei and the corrupt bureaucrats that surround him and the dismissal of Zeid Ben Shaker, the supreme commander and his replacement by the royalist Sharif Nasser etc, etc.

The rationale for the «isolationists» was offered by the «distinguished» economic advisor to the King, Morawid Tell, brother of the famous Wasfi, who was assassinated by the Black September movement (Nov. 28, 1971). Tell said: «If all the Arabs and the Palestinians want the Palestinians to take over the West Bank, we should not try to force our way to take over the West Bank. We would be rid of the constant attacks of the Arab world, which wrongly blames us for the woes of the Palestinians, despite the fact we are the one state to have given them citizenship and helped them integrate socially and economically.»

Shortly after the ill-starred «rebellion» was squelched, the AP returned to the fray. It reported from Amman (Feb. 27, 1974) that: King Hussein may soon abandon his efforts to regain control of the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan river, diplomatic observers believe.» The AP pointed out that «Hussein is believed to have come to terms with his isolation on the West Bank question», but it reminded its readers of a «vital» question: «will Israel, consistently opposed to a Palestinian state, cede the West Bank peacefully? Premier Golda Meir might arrange even new elections before any withdrawal from the banks of the Jordan.» it answered. The AP indicated that only «the U.S. could change Israeli thinking, through the firmest guarantees.» It concluded: «The PLO is said to be willing to allow the West Bankers form a national body to represent it at resumed Geneva talks, where Israel would be dealing with more moderate men it knows well, sources suggest.»

Abu Ammar and Abu Iyad and their most recently acquired ideologue, Naef Hawatmeh, of the P.D.F., have let it be known that they are ready to rule over any piece of territory «ceded» by Israel to the PLO. What they seem unable to understand is that neither Israel, nor Jordan nor the Arab states can deliver a Palestinian state on a silver platter: only armed struggle will liberate Palestine, not the Geneva Conference, the Arab League or the Israeli-U.S. alliance. And if a Palestinian entity is offered, it will be a dwarf whose functions will make it a sentinel state, not a sovereign Arab Palestine! The only question that remains before us is then: Has the PLO become again the prisoner of the Arab League and Have we another Haj Amin in our midst again, and what «distinguished» leader will become the Haj Amin of the 70's?



IRAN: WATCHDOG OF THE GULF



THE GULF : IMPERIALIST HINTERLAND OR ARAB BASTION

On March 15, 1974, the fashionable Beirut district of Ramle El-Bidah was awakened by an enormous explosion that shook the area but failed to detonate the tank-like Cadillac car of ambassador Mansour Ghader of Iran to Lebanon. The attack by « a chinese-made offensive hand grenade » was launched by a member of a Lebanese revolutionary movement whose statement regarding the matter declared in part (Al-Moharir, March 16, 1974): « In the Arab Gulf, the imperialistically assigned role of the hireling shahanshah regime is becoming clearer and clearer daily. In the past few years, it manifested itself in the occupation of Arab Islands in 1971 (Abu Musa and Greater and Smaller Tunbs); in the insolent intervention on the part of the Shah in the region of Dhofar with a view to suppressing the revolutionary uprising there and throughout the Arab Gulf; in the challenges taken to undermine the revolutionary order in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen ; in the armed provocations instigated against the national government of Iraq; and, in the accumulation of armaments whose purpose is the protection of imperialist interests and the assertion of Iranian despotism

The operation which sent the Lebanese «notables» scurrying to the ambassador's residence to offer their congratulations for his safety, was a clarion call to action to all Arab revolutionaries to stand up to the Iranian invasion of the Gulf, to beware of Arab collaborationists in Lebanon and elsewhere, and, to underline the links that bind Iran, Is-

rael, the U.S. and the Arab right-wing together.

The statement continued that «the Jihad Asad operation» was designed to express its solidarity with the persecuted democrats of Iran; to remind the Shah and his sponsors that the Arab people will foil their imperialistic schemes in the Gulf; to expose the Lebanon authorities that remain silent and ignore Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory ; and, to serve notice on friend and foe that «the tyrant Ghader» played a decisive role in the Massacre of Amman in Sept. of 1970 and that he is in Lebanon to co-ordinate «conspiratorial activities» against Lebanon and the Arab world with the help of «the Laos legend», the U.S. ambassador to Beirut, Mr. Godley, who according to the British Guardian's Open File (March 14, 1974) is:

«In charge of the embassy that coordinates all US ventures, including CIA infiltration of resistance groups and Arab intelligence networks, from Jordan to the Gulf. 'If anyone is temperamentally suited to sabotage a Middle East peace settlement,' one of the Ambassador's colleagues recently remarked, 'it's Godley.' But another US official was less harsh. 'Why all this picking on poor Mac Godley?' he demanded. 'Compared to most Nixon appointees, Godley's not only a statesman, but a saint.'»

With Godley and Ghader in Beirut, Richard Helms, the former CIA director in Tehran, and Robert McClosky in Nicosia, Cyprus, the Middle East must have been earmarked and singled out as an area of top priority for «friendly» U.S. behind-the-scenes actions in favor of

«freedom» in the coming years.

In a nutshell, while the Arab world's attention is riveted on the so-called Arab-Israeli confrontation, a substantial proportion of the Gulf is being occupied by proxy as its resources are being plundered by U.S., British, French and Dutch-owned oil cartels. The new « saviour » whose autocracy bristles with U.S. phantoms and British Chieftains is, of course, the Shah of Iran, who, according to Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi foreign minister, has assumed « joint responsibility » for the Gulf with Saudi Arabia «to face the veritable challenges launched against it by foreign conspirators» (Iran Tribune, Jan. 1973, p. 5). The nameless «foreign conspirators» seem to be the conjured up *raison d'être* that cements «harmony between Iran and Saudi Arabia (which) is essential for stability in the Persian Gulf and to the defense of the Gulf against external conspiracies».

Since we are primarily concerned with the Shah's role in the newly-concocted imperialist plot to dominate the Gulf, we shall merely cite a single irrefutable reference to illustrate Arab right-wing acquiescence in and cooperation with U.S. planners. In an interview with Nicholas C. Proffitt of Newsweek (Sept. 10, 1973, p. 12), King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, thus responded to Proffitt's queries regarding the Shah's leadership and his unconcealed aims in the Gulf region:

«G. In view of Iran's rapid military build-up and the Shah's declared goal of supremacy in the Gulf, do you foresee any competition over

whether it is to be the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf?

A. The countries bordering on the gulf are Iran and the other littoral Arab states. Military capability does not change the nature of things. It should be directed toward cooperation rather than competition and toward checking the dangers that threaten this sensitive area.

Q. The Shah has told Newsweek he will not tolerate the take-over of any of the Gulf shiekhdoms by radical regimes. Isn't it your responsibility rather than Tehran's to prevent such events on this side of the water?

A. The preservation of stability in the gulf area is the responsibility of all the states bordering on it and they must cooperate with each other to insure this.»

As if the Iranian position needed further elaboration, the *Kayhan International* (Sept. 16, 1973) took it upon itself to state it in a most unequivocal manner in its special supplement that celebrated the Shahanshah 32nd anniversary since he «ascended» the throne on Sept. 16, 1941. It said: «The Persian Gulf is Iran's lifeline. It must be opened at all costs...»

Iran has to guard against a number of eventualities-aggressive Iraqi intentions against Iran and the other Persian Gulf states; a successful bid for power by the Dhofar rebels, thus threatening the sensitive Straits of Hormuz; radical coups in other Persian Gulf states ; terrorist attacks against Persian Gulf shippings, particularly oil tankers; and any excuse which would introduce great power rivalry into the Persian Gulf.

Kayhan International quoted the Shah as saying: «Events in the world have taught us that the sea contiguous to the Gulf of Oman, and I mean the Indian Ocean, recognizes no frontiers... We are thinking of Iran's security perimeters, and I am not speaking in terms of a few kilometers. Anyone versed in geopolitical, strategic matters, and especially in possibilities of naval and air forces today, would guess how distant that frontier could be from Chah Bahar.»

The self-professed « architect » of Gulf policies, the Shah, has a divinely-ordained self-image of himself. He appears to believe he's anointed and he's practically on the verge of proclaiming his own divinity. In a wide-ranging interview with the world-famous lady journalist, Oriana Fallaci (Oct. 1973, *Boston Sunday Globe*, Jan. 6, 1974 p. A1, A2) in which he expressed his contempt for women, his love of authoritarianism and his pleasure in destroying the «radical» opposition, the Shah made the following disclosure : «I have been chosen by God to perform a task. My visions were miracles that saved

the country. My reign has saved the country, and it has done so because God was on my side.» As if this statement were not enough to indict him as a megalomaniac, the Shah revealed more of his vanity :

«Q. When I attempt to talk about you, here in Tehran, people withdraw into fearful silence. They don't even dare to utter your name. Your Majesty, why is that?

A. From exaggerated respect, I should suppose. Because, in fact, they don't behave that way at all with me. When I returned from America, I drove through the city in an open car and, from the airport to the palace, a crowd of at least half a million people, overcome with enthusiasm, applauded me wildly. They shouted patriotic slogans, cheered me lustily and showed no signs of a fearful silence such as you mention. Nothing has changed from the day I became King and the people lifted my car on their shoulders and carried it for three miles. Yes : three miles or so separated the house where I lived from the building where I was

that he is led by divine visions to perform miracles.»

Because Iran's potential is so great and the Shah's self-image and objectives dovetail with imperialist designs, the U.S. has selected him as the new guarantor of the world's oil jugular and decided to arm him in a manner that befit a «super regional power» i.e., \$5 Billion worth of weaponry and U.S. generals to supervise it. Since the Shah is no amateur in «the game of nations» and knows that he is indebted to the U.S. for his position and status, he's adept at playing the «game» in the age of neo-colonialism. Moreover, since he excelled as the central pillar of the «Northern tier» concept in the 1950's and 1960's and turned Tehran into the headquarters of CENTO after the demise of the Baghdad Pact (July, 1958), it follows that in the twilight of the British empire, there is no empire more effective, decisive and capable than of neo-colonialism served by a local power which it impregnated, conceived and delivered, and named its «regional superpower». Thus, we can understand the Shah's vision of regional defense which he discolored to Arnaud de Bochgrave (Newsweek, May, 21, 1973 p. 20-21):

«My concept is that the riparian states should form some kind of mutual-assistance pact like NATO and ask the major powers to stay out of the gulf. It would become our mare nostrum. If everyone except Iraq agreed, how could Iraq say, 'No, we want the Soviet Navy in here'? It would be an untenable ridiculous position. But if we cannot achieve that, then it's up to the U.S. to decide how best to defend its interests in the area. (The three small vessels you now have based in Bahrain (are) the same as nothing. The Soviets are visiting us with 17,000-ton cruisers.»

In his essay on the power of the Shah, Mr. De Bochgrave refers to America's «policeman» in the Gulf as «the colossus of the oil lanes» and the following question and answer illustrate the background and motives that propelled the Shah to become America's «colossus»:

«Q. What were the factors that made you decide to become the strongest military power in the area?

A. I began thinking about it in 1959 or '60 when I concluded that the U.S. could not go on playing the role of international gendarme forever. The U.S. then told me not to worry because 'we can police the world with two airborne divisions'. But then came the British decision in 1968 to phase out of the gulf in 1971 and the obvious power vacuum that would ensue. After that, we suddenly saw divisions crossing international borders, the dismemberment of Pakistan, the mass media applauding, the U.N. once again paralyzed and

the powers sitting on their hands-and all this preceded by the Soviet-Indian treaty. Brute force was used, territory was annexed and no one was able to do anything about it.

Don't misunderstand me. I was against the intervention of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan. But this doesn't detract from the fact that India invaded and dismembered the country. It may even be better this way, but we're talking about a dangerous precedent for the future that convinced me we could only rely on ourselves. Then there was the Soviet treaty with Iraq a year ago-another alarm bell. Couple this with America's reluctance to play the role of gendarme even where its vital interests are concerned, and anyone with a modicum of geopolitical sense will conclude that we didn't have much choice in the matter nor did the U.S. in its decision to back us to the hilt.»

Furthermore, as a faithful power executor, the Shah assures his sponsors that they have nothing to fear and that they should depend on him to see to it that all is well on the Gulf. Here is an exchange of more ideas with de Bochgrave :

«Q. What are the main dangers that may threaten Western oil supplies in the future as you now see them?

A. The possibility that some of the regimes on the other side of the gulf may be overthrown by extremists and the subversive activities now going on. Take the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. If it ever succeeded, just try to imagine what we would be faced with in Muscat, the capital, right in front of the Strait of Hormuz. At first a few rifles. And then naval guns and missiles. It's a familiar pattern. I cannot tolerate subversive activities - and by that I mean anything that is imposed from the outside.

Q. Is that why you're helping Oman ?

A. They asked for our help and we sent it.

Q. Are you saying you cannot tolerate radical regimes taking over any of the Arab sheikdoms ?

A. Yes.»

The Shah's insatiable appetite for power and his masters' willingness to back him to the hilt in order to avoid the immediate use of their own direct military power in the area to restore «peace and stability» should the occasion ever present itself, impel him and his U.S. mentors to think of Iran not only as a Mideastern power but also as a South Asian one. Consequently, Mauritius has «agreed» to give Iran port facilities in exchange for an undisclosed amount of oil from Tehran and the rump that calls itself, Pakistan, has drawn closer to Iran to avert a Vietnam-style struggle in Baluchistan.

In other words, in the absence of

real but imagined enemies, the justification for the arms build-up remains hypothetical and precautionary. But since imperialism exercises in «contingency planning», it must continually prepare and reaffirm its position. In answering Johannes Engel's of Dier Spiegel (the Guardian Jan. 19, 1974, p. 17-18) charge that Iran is spending 26% of its budget on defense and there is one enemy in sight, the Shah's statement triggered a set of investigative questions :

«A. So, why are you spending the money? I am spending the money for exactly the same reason. I take no chances whatsoever. I have friends. I try to have even more friends, but we cannot only depend on our alliances. Sometimes we could be let down. Another thing : do you all agree that the October war with Israel was a surprise ? Consider the amount of weapons and the sophisticated weapons that were used against Israel - did you or did even the Israelis expect anything like this ? Everyone was surprised. So I take absolutely no chances. I must not depend on anyone but ourselves.

Q. Is there any security problem in the region around the Persian Gulf ?

A. Not immediately. There could be, because the funny thing is that you will see that in a rich country like some of these sheikdoms there is plenty of money and very few people. It should be a paradise, but we know there is a terrific underground subversive activity.

Q. Would Iran intervene on the other side of the Persian Gulf in case of a takeover by Pan Arabian radicals in one of the states ?

A. It's very difficult to envisage it if we're not asked to intervene by those countries themselves. I have proposed a regional pact, an agreement, a treaty, anything you want to call it, for the security and the integrity of the region. So far we have got no answer. The entrance of the Persian Gulf is a question of life and death for us. To keep it open, with or without the cooperation of others, is another answer to your question of why we spend money on our defense».

Finally, since the Shah parades himself as a self-determining man, we need only cite U.S. military sources to refute his allegations. Here is a **New York Times** report (May 20, 1973) that underscores the Shah's subservience to the U.S. and his value as a «regional superpower». The report postulates Iran as a bulwark of American support in a crucial, turbulent area. It says that Iran's importance is twofold: it is the second largest oil producer and it is «strategically crucial, bounded by the Soviet Union and the Caspian Sea in the north, Turkey and Iraq in the West.



to take the oath of loyalty to the Constitution. And I was riding in that car. I had covered but a few yards when the crowd hoisted the car and bore it, like a litter, for the whole three miles' distance on their shoulders. What was your question intended to mean? That they're all against me ?»

Reacting to the Fallaci interview and using the **New Republic** magazine's translation of Dec. 1, 1973, the **Iran Free Press** (Dec. 1973-Jan. 1974, p. 2) labeled the Shah «a liar, an assassin, a dictator, and a usurper of the sovereign rights of the Iranian people». It commented further with regards to his «perfidious personality»: «Above all, his words prove him to be mentally unsound as he reverts even to blasphemy, pretending to be so close to God and the prophets

IRAN AND THE GULF

Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east, and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman in the south.

Moreover, the crux of the Iran-U.S. relationship lies in the U.S. control of the Iranian armed forces, a role which is euphemistically called «advisory» rather than by its real name. The facts are U.S. military personnel in Iran perform many tasks ranging from piloting planes to handling cargo at the Tehran post office, and nothing can hide the facts. Let us however, return to the «official view» which is damning enough:

«The over-all number of American military personnel here, which is expected to total more than 1,100 makes it one of the largest armed forces assistance missions in Asia...

Another team, called the gendarmerie mission, advises the rural police force, which is responsible for about 80 per cent of the country.

The American commitment and interest here is made plain by, the unusually large embassy staff - some officials say that it is now larger than the embassy in New Delhi - and President Nixon's appointment three months ago of Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence, as Ambassador.»

As America's chosen Messiah in the Middle East and South Asia, the Shah, has acquired the stature of a world «statesman» and a coterie of apologists everywhere in the West. One of them is Theo Sommer, editor-in-chief of Die Zeit, who, in the post Iran-Oman era of hands stretched across the Gulf, has written (Newsweek, March 25, 1974, p. 17):

«It is determination to ensure that the oil does keep going out which, along with national pride and the requirement of defense and deterrence, lies behind Iran's tremendous armaments effort. That determination explains the occupation in 1971 of three small islands in the Straits of Hormuz, the entry into the Persian Gulf. It underlies the recent pact with the Sultanate of Oman, which occupies the coast across the straits from Iran. Most particularly, determination to keep the oil flowing provides the key to the Shah's naval and air strategy. His air force, complete with tankers for refueling mid-air, will soon have a range extending as far afield as Aden and Bombay. And tomorrow's Iranian Navy will be roaring the Indian Ocean right down to the tenth parallel - the line that marks the northern border of South African and Portuguese reconnaissance and patrol operations.

The Shah is not given to conversation about such military details. But he makes his philosophy quite clear. It is the kind of lifeline philosophy once propounded under simi-

lar circumstances by the British. The Shah leaves no one in doubt that he will project Iran's military power, not hesitating to use it when he sees the interest of his country in jeopardy. Asked about an Iranian naval presence in the Indian Ocean, he answers: «Why should we be ashamed in that? We have at least as much right to be there as any other power. And he is equally forthright about what might be called his Monroe Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. That doctrine serves notice on everybody that Iran will intervene anywhere, anytime that a threat, external or internal, arises to the Straits of Hormuz. Preferably, it will do so with the collaboration of the local rulers, but it will act on its own if such collaboration should not be forthcoming. Already a small Iranian expeditionary force is helping the Sultan of Oman to subdue a Communist-supported rebellion in his westernmost province.»

Meanwhile, the Shah in his infinite wisdom, love for his people, and concern for Arab posterity has dispatched Iranian troops to Oman to exorcise the specter of communism and save Qaboos' tyranny from the evils that beset it. At the conclusion of Qaboos' triumphant visit to Tehran (March 1-8, 1974), a holy matrimony of despotism was consummated and sealed. The Iran Free Press thundered in agony in reaction to the Observer report of Jan. 6, 1974 that 129 Iranian soldiers had been killed in the fighting in Dhofar in the last week of 1973: «With what amazing contempt the Shah sacrifices the flower of Iranian youth in the service of foreign masters.»

Lastly, has «Arab unity of ranks» meant the cession of the Gulf to Iran? If not, why has the Arab States' indifference continued in view of the mounting storm in the area? We have to ask further: Must Iraq remain alone in the battle against Iranian supremacy in the Gulf? Can the Shah's soldiery be permitted to march on Aden after it had set foot on Oman Arab territory for the first time since the 7th century?

Need the Arab national movement confine itself to inaudible protestations or must it emulate revolutionary deeds and carry it all the way to Gulf and on to Tehran with the cooperation of the oppressed of Iran? We proclaim a resounding No to shahanshah hegemony in the Gulf, to imperialist omnipotence over the seas that surround it and we call upon the forces of progress and enlightenment to unite together to stem the tide of counter-revolution and depose the shah and his protectors along with their Arab clients of Sheiks, Emirs, Sultans and Kings.

HAWATMEH-BURCHETT : FACT OR FANCY ?

tual basis) rather than clarifying to his readers the on-going debate among various elements of the P.L.O.

Is it not ludicrous to think that the P.F.L.P., waited for Iraq's O.K. before it registered its refusal of all capitulationist proposals including ; U.N. resolution 242, the proposed «state» and Hussein's Federation etc. ? The outright slander however is that they accuse Iraq of encouraging the resistance to take refuge in Iraq away from the center of our struggle - and actually imply that the P.F.L.P. was in agreement to such plans.

We do not need to defend Iraq, however as P.F.L.P., we categorically reject the allegation that Iraq asked us to stop our struggle and take refuge in their country for the time being. As P.F.L.P., our answer to the Imperialist plan has always included the need to increase and heighten the level of our struggle in a) the occupied territories ; b) Jordan ; c) all areas where our masses live. To be accused of wanting to take refuge is really quite contrary to our daily practice on all levels, political, military and mass work.

One might deduce that Burchett's ability in analyzing political developments in the resistance movement might be limited, but to our surprise he seems to suffer from an inability of reporting simple facts. In his March 6 article, he claims: «On February 24, at a mass meeting in the Beirut Municipal Stadium, 10,000 Palestinians rallied to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the formation of the P.D.F.» Not that numbers really matter, but a fact is a fact and should be reported as such. This writer who was also present at the rally estimated the participants at 2,000, maximum 3,000. Allowing for a margin of error let us say four to five thousand, that leaves Mr. Burchett a 100% off the mark. In addition, Burchett cited the figure 10,000 without adding that the quoted figure is his own estimate... or whose is it?

After being subjected to Hawatmeh's overt and Burchett's covert invective, we feel that it is up to the progressive reader to critically look at the issues and posit them in their proper historical context. Upon so doing, the absurdity of accusations such as «leftist opportunist» and «demagogic» would become crystal clear.

As of this writing, a Palestinian summit conference has already held one meeting. The results will be reported in the next issue of the bulletin. We also intend to discuss the working papers proposed to the P.L.O. and we will publish our suggestions to the Palestine National Council in a special issue and let the facts speak for themselves.

more so new), a major part of that region. This «step-by-step» process you espouse is not new, but apparently you seem unable in making the connection between this process with the existing conditions i.e., the balance of power.

Had our movement enjoyed such conditions, we guarantee you that the establishment of the state you are talking about would have been the direct result of our armed struggle and not due to either the «benevolence» or «altruism» of Imperialism.

As to Hawatmeh's claim that «At this stage we are fighting to end Israel's 1967 occupation of our lands», one must again express some doubt. No! We are fighting for the development of our potential capacity so as to wage a true people's war. After all, we can not mechanically differentiate between 1967 and the pre-1967 period, for that would indicate a shallow understanding of Zionism's intent for expansion.

If Imperialism has decided that some of the occupied lands are negotiable, we should not jump on the bandwagon and claim that our immediate, tactical goal is the return of lands captured in 1967. This however does not preclude a hypothetical situation in the future where only after a long period of armed struggle we can liberate these territories and then use them as a base for the liberation of the whole of Palestine. Such would be the proper material base upon which a legitimate people's «National Authority» can be founded. My dear sirs, reality which we are not willing to overlook has once again put your wishful thinking to sham.

As regards the second point we deduced from Burchett, some clarification is required. It is true that when the first working paper was proposed the Al-Saika had signed it, however due to pressures from their organizational base, they no longer support it and in fact they vociferously oppose the proposed «mini-state».

As to the third point which Burchett bases on the following quote from a P.D.F. responsible: «The essence of the discussion centered around Iraq's proposal, supported by George Habash of the P.F.L.P. that the resistance movement should reject all current efforts at a solution, should reject the formation of a Palestinian state and should all withdraw into Iraq to await a more propitious revolutionary situation.» Burchett of course is not responsible for this P.D.F. statement, but then should he not have had the moral courage to question the implicit allegations of the statement. Not having done so could only mean that Burchett was more interested in propagating a position (without having a proper fac-

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